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Abstract—In this paper, a theoretical evaluation framework
regarding the Satisfaction Equilibrium (SE) in wireless com-
munication networks is introduced and examined. To study
these equilibria operation points, we coin some new concepts,
namely the Valued Satisfaction Equilibrium, the Price of Efficiency
and the Max Price of Satisfaction, which can be used for
measuring the efficiency of the obtained equilibria solutions.
The aforementioned framework is analyzed and evaluated in a
wireless communication environment under the presence of the
Gaussian Interference channel (GIC). Within this setting, a non-
cooperative game among the users is studied, where users aim in a
selfish manner to meet their Quality of Service (QoS) prerequisite.
However instead of maximizing the QoS which is generally energy
costly, we evangelize that better energy-efficiency is achieved
by targeting satisfactory QoS levels only. The sufficient and
necessary conditions that lead to the Satisfaction Equilibrium
are provided for the two-user case and the Efficient Satisfaction
Equilibrium (ESE) is determined, where the users satisfy their
QoS constraints with the lowest possible cost. Moreover, specific
measures for evaluating the efficiency of various satisfaction
equilibria, in a formal and quantitative manner, expressing the
tradeoff with respect to the achieved utility or a given objective
function and corresponding cost, are defined and analyzed.
Index Terms—Game Theory, QoS Satisfaction, Satisfaction
Equilibrium, Price of Efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Current and future wireless networks face new and interest-
ing challenges in the increasingly changing communications
environment. The volume of the transmitted data traffic and
the number of users are continuously increasing. Typically,
these systems present competitive environments that induce
constraints, and users evolve with others, where their decisions
and actions are interdependent.
In such a competitive and distributed environment, Game
Theory arises as a natural choice and a powerful theoretical
tool to cope with the corresponding resource allocation prob-
lems, while reflecting and modeling the different interactions
among the users [1]. Respecting the need for distributed and
scalable solutions and algorithms, the focus has been placed
on the study of non-cooperative game theory paradigm where
decisions are taken autonomously by the end users [2].
The majority of existing approaches have relied on the
principles of Expected Utility Maximization, where users aim
at selfishly maximizing their own degree of satisfaction upon
receiving a service, as expressed through various forms of
utility functions, resulting to some equilibrium [3]. However,
firstly a major disadvantage that is common to most of these
equilibrium concepts (e.g., Nash equilibrium) is that stability
depends on whether or not each user achieves the highest per-
formance possible. This does not necessarily properly reflect
in reality the most desirable solution, neither from a single user
point of view nor from a network point of view, as a user may
require only to ensure a specific minimum QoS condition [4].
To overcome this constraint and problem, in this work a new
solution concept known as Satisfaction Equilibrium (SE) [5] is
adopted and exploited in the realm of wireless communications
environments. The main purpose of this paper is to introduce
a holistic theoretical analysis and evaluation framework for
studying these equilibria in wireless communication networks,
with respect to conditions of existence and their efficiency. Its
application in the presence of Gaussian Interference channel
(GIC) is specifically analyzed and examined.
A. Related work and our contribution
Most of the efforts so far in the wireless communications
research community were concentrated on the total QoS
maximization, which however resulted in unjustified network
resources drainage or unfair resources allocation among the
users [6]. Instead, in our work to overcome these deficiencies,
we adopt the philosophy of aiming satisfactory QoS [5],
[7], [8] rather than targeting optimality in terms of QoS
maximization [9]. There are two key motivating factors behind
this consideration. The first one refers to meeting user expec-
tations. Several types of services are either simply interested
in achieving a minimum QoS level, or corresponding users
are insensitive to small QoS changes [5]. Furthermore, users
may not be willing to consume additional resources or pay
higher price for a better QoS level, which in turn translates
to an increase in network capacity in terms of satisfied users
[7]. The second factor behind the choice of satisfactory solu-
tions stems from the need of energy consumption reduction
[8], [10]. QoS maximization typically requires unnecessarily
high energies [3], whereas achieving an efficient and feasible
network operation point that meets users expectations can
result in substantial energy savings, a critical factor in several
resource-constrained environments.
This objective in this paper is treated via a novel mathemat-
ical concept within the framework of game theory, referred
2to as satisfaction equilibrium (SE) [8]. For studying these
equilibria, we introduce and coin some new concepts, namely
the Valued Satisfaction equilibrium, the Price of Efficiency
and the Max Price of Satisfaction, that can be used for
benchmarking purposes of the achievable solutions. The ap-
plicability of the aforementioned framework and concepts are
demonstrated considering a wireless communication environ-
ment characterized by Gaussian Interference channel, where
the users have limited transmission power [11]. Towards this
direction, we formulated the Gaussian Interference channel
as a non-cooperative game among the users, where each user
has a minimum QoS prerequisite, represented as a mini-
mum achievable data rate. Specific necessary and sufficient
conditions that lead to the SE for the two-user case are
obtained. The satisfaction equilibrium point is achieved when
all the users of the network (i.e., players in the game) satisfy
their minimum QoS requirements irrespective of the utility
value they achieve. Relaxing the maximization assumptions
essentially we enlarge the potential set of feasible strategies
since instead of restricting ourselves to solutions that permit
global optimum, we follow a less restrictive approach and
extend the solution space to a broader set. Subsequently the
main objective becomes - in contrast to reaching other forms
of equilibria such as Nash equilibrium (NE) - to reach a
network state in which all end users satisfy their individual
QoS by investing the minimum effort, referred to as Efficient
Satisfaction Equilibrium (ESE) [7].
B. Outline
The remaining of this work is organized as follows. In
Section II, the fundamental concepts from the field of Game
Theory are initially presented. Therefore, concepts such as
satisfaction equilibrium and efficient satisfaction equilibrium
are reviewed, while the new concepts and terms of valued
satisfaction equilibrium, price of efficiency, and max price of
satisfaction are defined. In Section III, the baseline proposed
Gaussian Interference Channel model is introduced, as well as
the users’ adopted utility function and accordingly the corre-
sponding game theoretic formulation of satisfying users’ QoS
prerequisites is presented. Section IV discusses the conditions
that lead to the satisfaction equilibrium for the two-user case,
while in Section V the price of efficiency and max price of
satisfaction for evaluating the efficiency of the various SEs in a
formal and quantitative manner, are analyzed. Finally Section
VI concludes this article.
II. GAME THEORY DEFINITIONS
We consider formally a game in satisfaction form as a tetrad
G =
(
N, {Ai}i∈N , {ui}i∈N , {fi}i∈N
)
,
where N is the set of the players with size |N |, Ai is the
set of all possible pure strategies (actions) of the player i, ui
is the utility function of the player i and fi is the set of all
satisfied actions under a constraint of the player i given the
actions of all other players. A strategy profile is an |N |-tuple
a = (a1, a2, . . . , a|N |) ∈ A1×A2×· · ·×A|N | of the strategies
of the players. Also, a−i is the strategy profile of all players
except for the player i. We have the following definitions.
Definition II.1 (Nash equilibrium [12]). A Nash equilibrium
is a strategy profile a∗ = (a∗i , a
∗
−i) such that, for any i and
any strategy ai ∈ Ai,
ui(a
∗
i , a
∗
−i) ≥ ui(ai, a
∗
−i).
Definition II.2 (Generalized Nash equilibrium [13]). A Gen-
eralized Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile a∗ = (a∗i , a
∗
−i)
such that, for any i,
a∗i ∈ fi(a
∗
−i), and
ui(a
∗
i , a
∗
−i) ≥ ui(ai, a
∗
−i),
for any ai ∈ fi(a
∗
−i).
Definition II.3 (Satisfaction equilibrium [8]). A satisfaction
equilibrium is a strategy profile a∗ = (a∗i , a
∗
−i) such that, for
any i,
a∗i ∈ fi(a
∗
−i).
Definition II.4 (Efficient satisfaction equilibrium [8]). An
efficient satisfaction equilibrium is a strategy profile a∗ =
(a∗i , a
∗
−i) such that, for any i,
a∗i ∈ fi(a
∗
−i), and ci(a
∗) ≤ ci(a),
for any a = (ai, a
∗
−i) with ai ∈ fi(a
∗
−i), where ci : A1×A2×
. . . A|N | 7→ R+ is a cost function.
In the following we first introduce the Valued Satisfaction
equilibrium, which essentially corresponds to efficient satisfac-
tion equilibria, with a new cost function ci/ui measuring the
tradeoff between the achieved utility ui and the corresponding
initial cost ci. Specifically:
Definition II.5 (Valued satisfaction equilibrium). A valued
satisfaction equilibrium is a strategy profile a∗ = (a∗i , a
∗
−i)
such that, for any i,
a∗i ∈ fi(a
∗
−i), and
ci(a
∗)
ui(a∗)
≤
ci(a)
ui(a)
,
for any for any a = (ai, a
∗
−i) with ai ∈ fi(a
∗
−i), where ci
is the cost function and ui the utility function, assuming that
ci(a) > 0 and ui(a) > 0 for any a ∈ A1 ×A2 × . . . A|N |.
Below, we also introduce a new concept, referred to as
Price of Efficiency, to measure the efficiency of the efficient
satisfaction equilibria. Intuitively, this concept aims to evaluate
in a formal and quantitative manner, the efficient satisfaction
equilibria solution, in terms of tradeoff between the achieved
utility and cost, when compared to the valued satisfaction
equilibrium operation point.
Definition II.6 (Price of Efficiency). Let a∗ be a strategy
profile such that it is the best valued satisfaction equilibrium
(under the summation function). Furthermore, let a be a
strategy profile such that a is the worst efficient satisfaction
3equilibrium (under the summation function). Then, the Price
of Efficiency (PoE) is
PoE =
∑
∀i
ci(a)
ui(a)∑
∀i
ci(a∗)
ui(a∗)
,
assuming that ci(a) > 0 and ui(a) > 0 for any a ∈ A1 ×
A2 × · · · ×A|N |.
Last but not least, we also define a measure indicating the
maximum price (i.e., distance) characterizing the achievable
satisfaction equilibria, under the consideration of an objective
function g. Formally:
Definition II.7 (Max Price of Satisfaction). Let a∗ be a
strategy profile such that it is a satisfaction equilibrium and it
is an optimal of an objective function g, i.e., g is the sum of the
utilities (utilitarian optimum). Furthermore, let a be a strategy
profile such that a is the worst satisfaction equilibrium under
the objective function g. Then, the Max Price of Satisfaction
(MPoSa) is
MPoSa =
g(a∗)
g(a)
,
assuming that g(a) > 0 for any a ∈ A1 × A2 × · · · ×A|N |.
Since, g(a∗) ≥ g(a), we have that the MPoSA is no less
than one.
III. THE MODEL
We consider |N | pairs of transmitter-receiver in the Gaus-
sian Interference Channel. Any transmitter i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |N |}
uses the same frequency to transmit her message to her
receiver i and simultaneously interferes the receivers of the
other transmitters. Any receiver i treats the signal of a trans-
mitter j different than i as interference. We can see this
competitive situation as a non-cooperative game [14]. Any
transmitter wants to maximize her rate. The set of the pure
strategies of any transmitter i is the power pi ∈ [0, Pmax]
that chooses to transmit her message, where Pmax is the
maximum possible power, imposed by physical constraints
and equipment characteristics. The utility function of any
transmitter i is
ui(pi,p−i) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
hiipi
|N |∑
j=1
j 6=i
hjipj + I
)
, (1)
where hji > 0 is the channel attenuation between the trans-
mitter j and the receiver i, p−i is the vector of the powers of
the transmitters except for the transmitter i and I > 0 is the
Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) of the channel. This
can be written as
ui(pi,p−i) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
pi
|N |∑
j=1
j 6=i
ajipj + Ii
)
, (2)
where aji = hji/hii > 0 is the new channel attenuation
between the transmitter j and the receiver i and Ii = I/hii. We
give the following definitions in the context of the Gaussian
Interference channel.
Definition III.1 (Nash equilibrium). A strategy profile
(p∗i ,p
∗
−i) is a Nash equilibrium such that, for any i and for
any pi,
ui(p
∗
i ,p
∗
−i) ≥ ui(pi,p
∗
−i),
in other words p∗i is a best-response strategy to the strategies
p
∗
−i of the other transmitters.
Definition III.2 (Generalized Nash equilibrium). A strategy
profile (p∗i ,p
∗
−i) is a generalized Nash equilibrium such that,
for any i and for any pi such that ui(pi,p
∗
−i) ≥ Γi, we have
ui(p
∗
i ,p
∗
−i) ≥ ui(pi,p
∗
−i),
where Γi is a positive constant representing user’s i QoS
prerequisites in terms of achievable transmission data rate.
Definition III.3 (Satisfaction equilibrium). A strategy profile
(p∗i ,p
∗
−i) is a satisfaction equilibrium such that, for any i,
ui(p
∗
i ,p
∗
−i) ≥ Γi,
in other words p∗i is a satisfaction strategy to the strategies
p
∗
−i of the other transmitters, Γi is the satisfaction threshold
(positive constant) of the transmitter i.
Definition III.4 (Efficient satisfaction equilibrium). A strategy
profile (p∗i ,p
∗
−i) is an efficient satisfaction equilibrium, if it is
a satisfaction equilibrium and, for any i and any pi such that
ui(pi,p
∗
−i) ≥ Γi, we have
p∗i ≤ pi,
or in other words the transmitter i uses the less power to be
satisfied.
Definition III.5 (Valued satisfaction equilibrium). A strategy
profile (p∗i ,p
∗
−i) is a valued satisfaction equilibrium, if it is a
satisfaction equilibrium and, for any i and any pi such that
ui(pi,p
∗
−i) ≥ Γi, we have
p∗i
ui(p∗i ,p
∗
−i)
≤
pi
ui(pi,p∗−i)
.
IV. EXISTENCE OF SE
The satisfaction equilibria of the Gaussian Interference
channel have been studied previously in [7], [8] but no
conditions of existence have been given. In this paper we will
investigate the conditions of existence of satisfaction equilibria
in this scenario. By the utility function of the player i we have
ui(pi,p−i) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
pi
|N |∑
j=1
j 6=i
ajipj + Ii
)
≥ Γi (3)
⇔ pi ≥ (4
Γi − 1)
( |N |∑
j=1
j 6=i
ajipj + Ii
)
. (4)
4These are the inequalities that characterize the region of the
SE. We can write up the inequalities (3) as a linear system
A · p ≥ b, (5)
where
A =


1 a21(1 − 4
Γ1) . . . a|N |1(1− 4
Γ1)
a12(1− 4
Γ2) 1 . . . a|N |2(1− 4
Γ2)
. . .
a1|N |(1− 4
Γ|N|)a2|N |(1 − 4
Γ|N|). . . 1

 ,
p =

 p1p2
. . .
p|N |

 , and b =


(4Γ1 − 1)I1
(4Γ2 − 1)I2
. . .
(4Γ|N| − 1)I|N |

 .
There is at least one SE if there is at least one feasible solution
in the system A · p ≥ b .
A. Two-player game
We study the conditions of existence of the SE in the case of
the two players and we conclude to the following Theorems.
Theorem 1. The satisfaction equilibrium region of the two-
player game is the region such that p1 ≥ (4
Γ1−1)(a21p2+I1)
and p2 ≥ (4
Γ2 − 1)(a12p1 + I2).
Proof. By the utility function of the player 1 we have
u1(p1, p2) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
p1
a21p2 + I1
)
≥ Γ1
⇔ p1 ≥ (4
Γ1 − 1)(a21p2 + I1).
Similarly, for the player 2 we have
u2(p2, p1) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
p2
a12p1 + I2
)
≥ Γ2
⇔ p2 ≥ (4
Γ2 − 1)(a12p1 + I2).
Since, Γ1 and Γ2 are positive is clear that (4
Γ1 − 1)(a21p2 +
I1) > 0 and (4
Γ2 − 1)(a12p1 + I2) > 0.
Theorem 2. There is at least one satisfaction equilibrium if
and only if the lines
p2 = p1/((4
Γ1 − 1)a21)− I1/a21 (6)
and
p2 = (4
Γ2 − 1)(a12p1 + I2) (7)
cross in the first quadrant, or in other words a21a12 <
1
(4Γ1−1)(4Γ2−1)
.
Proof. Graphically, there is at least one feasible solution in the
area described by p1 ≥ (4
Γ1−1)(a21p2+I1) and p2 ≥ (4
Γ2−
1)(a12p1 + I2) if and only if the two lines p2 =
p1
(4Γ1−1)a21
−
I1
a21
and p2 = (4
Γ2 − 1)(a12p1 + I2) cross each other in the
first quadrant. In order the two lines to cross each other in the
first quadrant the slope of the first one must be greater than the
slope of the second one. Thus, 1
(4Γ1−1)a21
> (4Γ2−1)a12.
p2
p1
(4Γ1 − 1)I1
(4Γ2 − 1)I2
ESE
(6)
(7)
Fig. 1: The area of the satisfaction equilibria
Theorem 3. The efficient satisfaction equilibrium exists if
and only if a21a12 <
1
(4Γ1−1)(4Γ2−1)
and is equal to(
(4Γ1−1)(a21(4
Γ2−1)I2+I1)
1−(4Γ1−1)(4Γ2−1)a21a12
, (4
Γ2−1)(a12(4
Γ1−1)I1+I2)
1−(4Γ1−1)(4Γ2−1)a21a12
)
.
Proof. For fixed strategy of the one player, the other player
tries to be satisfied with the minimum power in the satisfaction
equilibrium region. So, it is easy to see that the efficient
satisfaction equilibrium must be on all boundaries of the
satisfaction region. This is the cross point of the lines (6) and
(7). The cross point is the solution of the system
p1 = (4
Γ1 − 1)(a21p2 + I1),
p2 = (4
Γ2 − 1)(a12p1 + I2),
which has solution the pair(
(4Γ1−1)(a21(4
Γ2−1)I2+I1)
1−(4Γ1−1)(4Γ2−1)a21a12
, (4
Γ2−1)(a12(4
Γ1−1)I1+I2)
1−(4Γ1−1)(4Γ2−1)a21a12
)
. We
want this solution to be non negative. Since the nominators
are non negative the denominators must be positive, so
1 − (4Γ1 − 1)(4Γ2 − 1)a21a12 > 0. But this holds since
a21a12 <
1
(4Γ1−1)(4Γ2−1)
.
By this theorem we conclude to the following lemma.
Lemma 4. The efficient satisfaction equilibrium is unique.
We now search for the valued satisfaction equilibria of the
game and we conclude to the following theorem.
Theorem 5. The valued satisfaction equilibrium coincides
with the efficient satisfaction equilibrium.
Proof. We do the analysis from the player 1 point of view, the
analysis for the other player is symmetric. Fix a strategy p∗2
of the player 2. Then, we search for the strategy of the player
1 that minimizes the p11
2
log(1+
p1
a21p
∗
2
+I1
)
. The derivative of this
is
1
2 log(1 +
p1
a21p∗2+I1
)−
1
2
p1
p1+a21p∗2+I1
1
4 (log(1 +
p1
a21p∗2+I1
))2
=
1
2 log(1 +
p1
a21p∗2+I1
)− 1/2
1+
a21p
∗
2
+I1
p1
1
4 (log(1 +
p1
a21p∗2+I1
))2
,
which is positive for p1 > 0, so in this interval the function
is increasing. Thus, the best strategy for the player 1 is the
minimum in the satisfaction equilibrium area. This means
similarly to the ESE that the valued satisfaction equilibrium
5is on all boundaries of the satisfaction equilibrium area, so on
the cross point.
V. THE PRICE OF EFFICIENCY AND THE MAX PRICE OF
SATISFACTION
We study the Price of Efficiency in the Gaussian Interfer-
ence channel as a measurement of the efficiency of the efficient
satisfaction equilibrium in terms of the tradeoff between the
achieved rate and the power cost to achieve this rate. We
conclude to the following theorem.
Theorem 6. The Price of Efficiency in the Gaussian Interfer-
ence channel is equal to 1.
Proof. Since, the efficient satisfaction equilibrium coincides
with the valued satisfaction equilibrium it is easy to see that
the PoE is equal to 1.
We now study the maximum price of satisfaction taking
as an objective function a function that minimizes the sum
of the powers, or in other words maximizes the ratio one
over the sum of the powers. It is easy to see that the
efficient satisfaction equilibrium is the optimum solution of
this objective function in the area of the satisfaction equilibria.
On the other hand assuming that the (Pmax, Pmax) is in the
satisfaction equilibrium area, this is the worst case of this
objective function. Thus, it is easy to see that the maximum
price of satisfaction is equal to the ratio 2Pmax∑
∀i
Pi
, where Pi is
the power of the player i in the ESE.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we argued that by rethinking the overall
traditional QoS provisioning and user experience perception
in wireless networks that targeted QoS maximization, we can
devise energy-efficient, scalable, and rewarding solutions from
both practical and theoretical viewpoints, through the adoption
of the general concept of satisfaction equilibrium. Therefore, a
novel holistic framework was introduced towards studying dif-
ferent efficient and feasible wireless network operation points
(i.e., different game theoretic satisfaction equilibria points)
that meet users expectations, while resulting in substantial
cost or energy savings, which are critical factors especially in
resource-constrained environments. This new framework was
in particular analyzed in a wireless communication environ-
ment under the presence of the Gaussian Interference channel,
while the efficiency of the various satisfaction equilibria was
evaluated in a formal and quantitative manner. The current
analysis can be extended via considering multi-service wire-
less communication environments, where the users’ utilities
are differentiated based on their requested services, i.e., real-
time and non-real time services [15]. In this case, the study
of Price of Efficiency is interesting and challenging, as the
problem becomes more complicated indicating that the PoE
may not be equal to 1.
It should be noted that the realization of new decision-
making paradigms addressing the requirements of flexibility,
adaptability, and autonomicity in future wireless networks,
depends on bridging the gap between the considered game
theoretic methodologies described above, and practical wire-
less applications and settings. The efficient computation of the
satisfaction equilibria is hard in practice even for games which
satisfy the necessary conditions of existence and convergence
to them in theory, due to the inherent difficulties that wireless
networks face in practice. Part of our current and future
research work, includes the use of learning approaches in game
theory, in order to deal with the technical and implementation
challenges stemming from the incompleteness of available
information regarding the game structure and uncertainty on
the observations of the users and their actions in the game
that in turn may influence decision making and equilibrium
identification and convergence.
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